ON October 10 the battalion marched away from Steenvoorde to Abeele, where it entrained for Ypres. There was a light but fairly constant fall of rain during the day; and it required little rain to reduce that battle-swept area to a condition of sloppy mud. Seen against the dull glowering sky of the October evening, ruined Ypres looked a dreary place. The same evening after 8 o'clock the battalion set out for Westhoek Ridge, when it was sufficiently dark to make movement of troops prudent. There it settled down in trenches and such scant shelter as the place afforded.
Next day the operation-order was received, according to which a section of the enemy's defences between Zonnebeke and Passchendaele Ridge was to be attacked. The 47 th and 48th Battalions were the units of the 12th Brigade involved. On the left of the brigade front the 3rd Australian Division was to operate, whilst the 13th Brigade was to be on the right flank.
The operation was to be an extensive one, involving a great number of troops. Yet time for preparation was very short as the attack was to be launched on the morning of the 12th. At midnight the battalion left Westhoek Ridge, and started on its long journey to the line from which the advance was to take place. The journey in the dark over country broken up by shell-holes filled with water, and deep enough to drown unwary wounded who might fall into them, recalled some of the worst memories of Pozieres Ridge. Those of the battalion taking part in the attack altogether numbered 621, viz., 21 officers and 600 of other ranks. They were to be at the jumping-off trench an hour before the attack was to be launched; but such were the delays and incidents of that winding trail in the darkness that they arrived only eight minutes before the appointed hour.
The troops were, therefore, just in position when the barrage fell that heralded the beginning of the attack. The railway from Ypres to Routers ran through the country whose capture was the objective of the operation. On the railway embankment rested the extreme left company of the 48th Battalion, and the left flank of the brigade front. Three companies of the battalion advanced on an even front, the fourth company following up in close support.
Shortly after the advance started the enemy's defensive barrage fell on our lines, just behind the jumping-off trench, and was so prompt and so well placed as to show that he was on the alert. But his infantry showed little resistance. Two officers and 200 of other ranks were quickly taken prisoner by our men, and his only show of activity consisted in very effective sniping and machine-gun fire from pill boxes.
When, however, the battalion with the units operating on the right of it had advanced some distance, it was soon evident that all was not well with the troops on the left flank of the brigade. There, on the other side of the railway line, the advance seemed to have been checked almost at its start. The left company of the 48th Battalion was, therefore, compelled to stop, and to swing back so as to form a protecting flank for the troops on its right. At the same time machine guns and trench mortars were directed from the 48th front against the enemy trenches that opposed the troops on the left flank. In this way those troops were enabled to push their advance further, and the connecting company of the 48th Battalion advanced accordingly.
But it was soon evident that no further success would be achieved by the troops on the left of the railway line. The extreme left company of the 48th front, therefore, set about permanently adapting its line to the task of protecting the companies on its right. The result was not an effective protecting flank, and the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from the left continued to thin our ranks along the brigade front.
Whilst things were in this state it was brought home to the advancing troops that they must dig in somewhere so as to obtain cover from the continuous sniping. A party of men, therefore, composed of both 47th and 48th Battalions, rushed forward some distance and established several outposts. Others followed suit, and by 8 o'clock in the morning the brigade front was established after a fashion and the work of consolidating the position was begun.
The adventure, however, had little chance of success. It was the old story of a flank in the air which constituted an inviting target to the enemy from whatever position he chose to aim at it. In such a situation communication with headquarters of the battalion could not be effectively and adequately maintained, for rifles and machine-guns registered many chances against a runner getting through with his message. The practice was resorted to of sending two runners carrying the same message, and both would be victims to the flying bullets before they had reached their goal. Early in the morning contact was made by aeroplane with our men in the advanced outposts; but after that they saw no more of our planes, and had to settle down to await what might be in store for them.
At 3.30 in the afternoon the enemy put a heavy artillery barrage on the positions occupied by our troops. Half an hour later his infantry could be seen advancing for a frontal attack, about 400 yards wide and apparently with perfect confidence. But our rifle and machine-gun fire dispersed the advancing Germans and warded off this attack. Shortly afterwards his infantry again formed up, this time in even greater numbers but advancing more cautiously. It was soon manifest that our fire would not avail to stop this sally, and our men had to fall back from the outposts which they had established in front of the new line. The poor fellows in those outposts had a hard fate; for whilst withdrawing from the frontal attack of the enemy, they were cut down by the same murderous sniping from the left flank. Very few of them got back.
Meanwhile things were going no better at the battalion headquarters, the mainspring of the battalion's activities, which was a short distance to the rear. The 47th and 48th Battalions had their headquarters in the same place, at an old pill-box but recently evacuated by the enemy. When the enemy made his counter-attack at 4 p.m. the SOS was promptly sent up by both battalions. But the message brought no answering artillery, and the two battalion commanders were engaged in repeating the signal when the enemy placed two shells on their headquarters in quick succession. It was fortune's last and hardest blow, for all around were gathered those details necessary to the work of a battalion headquarters in the field - signallers, runners, stretcher-bearers, medical orderlies. Very many of them were killed and nearly all the others including Colonel Leane and Colonel Imlay were severely wounded. Both units were thus deprived at the same time of most of the machinery necessary for their efficient working.
The German counter-attack was, however, for a time delayed in its development by the steady work of our Lewis guns. But the enemy now adopted different tactics, confining himself to a strong attack on our vulnerable left flank. By this time touch had been lost with the troops on that flank, and as a result of the new attack the 48th had to make a hurried withdrawal to a line further back.
It was then S o'clock in the evening and the hour brought no good fortune to the battalion. For on falling back to this new line they still saw no sign of the troops on their left flank, and later discovered that they had retired to the original Une. It was the last stroke and they made no further effort against such ill-fortune, but struck out immediately for the trenches they had left before daybreak.
Perhaps the hardest feature about the whole attempt was the fact that so many of the wounded were necessarily lost. When the battalion retired, the enemy following up so closely gave no chance to any man who fell badly wounded. Indeed in no situation of which the writer has had experience, was such evacuation of the wounded as was possible attended with greater difficulties. For the journey of the stretcher-bearers was a matter not of yards, but of miles, over that marshy country where a wheeled vehicle was altogether impracticable. Eight men formed the ordinary complement necessary to carry a stretcher through the heavy mud, and many were the relays that had to be established on the route. Leaving the wounded behind, however involuntary and inevitable, is a bitter experience, and it formed a fitting and gloomy climax to the ill fortunes of the day.
The evening, therefore, saw our men back on the line from which they had started early in the morning. They had indeed captured some prisoners. They had inflicted considerable losses on the enemy when he counter-attacked. But their own losses were also considerable. Two officers were killed and one was missing, whilst eight other officers had been wounded. Among other ranks 359 were killed, missing or wounded, and this out of a total of 621 officers and other ranks engaged in the operation. And they had gained not one yard of ground in return for the sacrifice.
Wherein lay the fault or what was the explanation of an attempt so futile and so barren of good results? It could not easily be determined. But at the time prudent minds were very dubious regarding the outcome of an operation of which individual units concerned had such little warning, and into which they seemed to be so precipitously rushed. Rumour among troops is as impersonal as tradition. Like tradition also it is often deservedly laughed at, and like tradition it is sometimes very wise. Rumour had it that a highly-placed Australian General strongly but vainly protested to the higher commands that such artillery preparation had not been arranged as was necessary to warrant hope of success. His alleged protest seemed to be supported afterwards by the event. For it was the inadequacy of such artillery preparation that caused the attack to be held up on the extreme left, a hold-up that practically affected the whole front of attack.
The sadly reduced battalion was withdrawn from the line and returned to Ypres under command of Major Brearley. Every article of equipment was deeply coated with mud. Rifles and Lewis guns were for the time being rendered useless from the same cause.
As our numbers were so small seven officers and 110 other ranks reported for duty from the nucleus camp, where they had been resting according to the order requiring a unit to leave a third of its effective strength out of the line. Thus reinforced the small battalion went to Anzac Ridge on the 19th, there to remain in support. They were no sooner in position, however, than the brigade was advised of other arrangements having been made. The 48th battalion was relieved and marched away from the neighbourhood of Passchendaele.