MANY were the changes of plan and destination for the battalion in those days of uncertainty. On April 9 the unit set out for Coisy, a village some six miles north-east of Bussy-les-Daours. After spending a day there it again packed up its many belongings, its pots and its dixies, its boilers and water-carriers, and trudged off just the same distance north-east of Coisy. The battalion having thus solemnly marched the two sides of an equilateral triangle settled down at Beaucourt on April 12, and used bad language about people who sat in high and comfortable places unable to make up their minds.
Very urgent work was apparently required of the battalion. On the following day all hands were busy on the construction of strong-points that were to form part of a reserve line of defence. The men worked all through the night and till 6 o'clock on the evening of the following day. Afterwards the unit carried on the work in two shifts, the first from 7 a.m. till 7 p.m., and the second from 1 p.m. till 7 p.m. When the strong-points were completed, the work of linking them up was begun, and on the 18th of the month that portion of the reserve line allotted to the battalion had been completed.
On the same date General Gellibrand was invalided and Colonel Leane took charge of the brigade. Major Allen temporarily assumed control of the 48th. Under the changed circumstances the unit settled down to training its reinforcements; whilst every day officers went forward to reconnoitre different parts of the front line, that they might be prepared in case the battalion was ordered into action at short notice.
The men were looking forward to spending an unusually dull Anzac day at Beaucourt. On the morning of the 23rd, however, they heard the enemy's heavy gun-fire, and it became only too plain to them that he was attacking some part of the line. It was soon evident that Anzac day should not be spent at Beaucourt, and at noon of the day preceding it orders were received for the battalion to be ready to move at an hour's notice. It did not actually leave Beaucourt until late in the evening, and then went no further than Pont Noyelles, a village lying some three miles to the south. There the night was spent, and when Anzac day dawned it gave every promise of being exciting enough even if not very festive. Motor buses soon arrived showing that the next destination of the battalion was to be some distance away, and that no time was to be wasted in marching. All surplus kit, packs and blankets were dumped, and the unit stood ready to embuss at 15 minutes' notice.
Nothing definite was known by anyone of the battalion as to the reason for all this dispatch, but it was generally understood that British troops had been pushed out of Villers-Bretonneux. All waited, but still no word came to embuss. Then someone remembered that it was Anzac day, that the members of the regimental band were not required to go into the line, that therefore the band should be doing something to earn its rations. The poor band, many were the times that it was reminded of its immunity from the risks and fatigues of the line! The band therefore turned out and gave an excellent concert which lasted for nearly three hours. By this time night had fallen and the buses still remained unused. The report then began to spread that Australian units had restored the broken line, and as such a thing being very probable, and in the circumstances very desirable, the 48th casually accepted the rumour and went to bed. It afterwards transpired that on the morning of the 23rd the enemy had attacked the British front south of the Somme, and breaking through the line at Villers-Bretonneux succeeded in capturing the town. That same night the 13th and 15th Brigades counter-attacked and regained Villers-Bretonneux before daybreak of the following morning.
The day of the 26th was spent by the battalion in much the same spirit of expectancy, and then orders were received that it should relieve a unit of the 13th Brigade on the following night. This was changed several times. The following morning brought more changes of destination and of work; and when the battalion finally left Pont Noyelles at night, it made no use of the 'buses but marched to a place six miles further south. This was Cachy, a village less than two miles west of Villers-Bretonneux. There the unit relieved British troops.
In the position which the battalion now occupied it was in touch with French troops on its right, whilst it had the 47th Battalion on its left flank. Opposite the line and but a short distance below the southern outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux, a chateau stood on high ground and surrounded by a thick belt of timber. The place was known as Monument Wood, and was considered to give a dominating advantage to the enemy. The high ground afforded him a good view of the country in front. All work done on the Australian lines had been done at night, as the observation from Monument Wood made impossible work by day. Yet perhaps the greatest danger to Australian troops afforded by Monument Wood was the temptation it offered for attack.
An attack on Monument Wood was decided for on May 3. There was little time for the incoming unit to do more than make the necessary preparations. The construction of forward dumps of ammunition, flares, reserves of drinking water, and the making of careful reconnaissance could be accomplished only at night.
At the time the British front line ran due north and south on the east side of Villers-Bretonneux cutting the main railway line that connects Villers-Bretonneux with Amiens. When it crossed to the south side of the railway line, it ran roughly parallel with the railway for some distance and then gradually veered towards the south. The Germans occupied formidable entrenchments along the fringe of the wood, protected by heavy wire entanglements. The whole position seemed from the subsequent fire to be a nest of machine-guns.
The 45th Battalion was holding that part of the line from which the attack was to be launched. On the night preceding the attack the 48th troops moved forward to the jumping-off trench. The strength of the unit was at this time 27 officers and 665 of other ranks, and before 2 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd the attacking troops were in position.
At 2 a.m. our artillery opened fire, and after a preliminary bombardment lasting two minutes the 48th advanced to the attack. Three companies took part in the assault, followed by a mopping-up party composed of three officers and 50 of other ranks drawn from the fourth company which was held in reserve. The companies began to advance on an even front. The machine-gun fire with which the enemy met them soon showed plainly that little or inadequate damage had been done by our artillery. Captain Imlay, commanding the left company, fell badly wounded under this fire. When the company had got to the enemy's wire entanglements, it found these an insuperable obstacle except on its right flank where a party of men got through to the objective.
The inadequate artillery preparation for the task was now evident along the whole front of attack. The company in the centre made some headway but was held up by the thick wire which rendered easy victims to the heavy machine-gun fire. On the right Captain Cumming was similarly blocked by the close timber and wire. He endeavoured to clear this obstacle by leading a party around it to attack on the western side, of the wood. Whilst doing so he was killed, and that attempt also ended in failure.
Better fortune attended to what might be called the informal party to the attack, the mopping-up party, though its success could not affect the general issue of the venture. This party under Lieutenant Stoerkel managed to get through a gap in the defences, and striking towards the chateau captured a German officer and 20 of other ranks.
Meanwhile daylight had come and tanks then went forward against the enemy's machine-gun positions. One of these fell into a German trench and becoming inoperative, its crew was captured. Later in the day it was destroyed by our artillery. The other tanks did good work, but they had entered the fighting at a time when the striking force of the infantry was already spent.
An attempt was made to form a line which, whilst embracing ground far short of the objective originally intended, should secure something in return for the day's losses. Before this could be consolidated the enemy made a strong counter-attack, which forced our troops back to the original line.
Twenty-one German prisoners represented the fruits of the day's attack on Monument Wood. On the other hand the battalion's casualties amounted to nine officers and 150 of other ranks, and indeed this total was a small one considering the magnitude of the task. The facility of wisdom after the event is proverbial; and even now it would be difficult to judge rightly from the opinion of the unit concerned the effect of a particular incident on the general result. At the time, however, it was considered an unfortunate undertaking, wherein success would scarcely have justified the sacrifice that failure made a tragedy.