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The position of the 44th after its advanced was promptly and accurately reported both from the ground and from the air. At the same time it became known at the headquarters concerned that the 48th had not attacked; its orders had been received too late. At dusk on the previous night two of its companies that had been sent to strengthen the battalions of its brigade that had made the afternoon attack, Lieutenant Stabback's [36] to the 45th and Captain Mayersbeth's [37] to the 47th. Shortley before midnight, on receipt of the order to attack, the remaining two were similarly distributed, Lieutenant Allen's [38] going to the 45th and Captain Cumming's to the 47th. At this stage the commanders of those two battalions (occupying blockhouses on the southern shoulder of Messines Ridge) were under the impression that these reinforcements were to dig on the Black Line until dawn (4 a.m.), and would probably then be ordered to advance. The two earlier companies were thus employed digging in, and the later ones had just arrived, and their commanders were asking for instructions at the two headquarters to which they had been directed, when, between 2.40 and 2.50 a.m., messengers stumbled in with orders that the attack should be launched at 3 o'clock. Lieutenant Stabback, with the 45th, hurried to get his company lined out, but although his men were ready at 2.55 no other company was there, and he returned to tell Colonel Herring (45th) that the advance had been rendered impossible. Captain Cumming, who was being instructed by Colonel Imlay (47th), received notice of zero hour a little later than Stabback, and both Imlay and he recognised that his troops could not be formed up in the time available. Imlay therefore told him to line out his company in the Black Line, beside Mayersbeth's and the reorganised portion of the 47th, and then to prepare for the attack by pushing forward his men - by two's and three's, if necessary, and from shell-hole to shell-hole - as for as he could. Meanwhile Imlay would arrange for a new bombardment, and when it descended Cumming should launch the final advance.
Cumming duly led his men [39] to the Black Line, and found Mayersbeth. The front was exceedingly quiet, and therefore, after widely extending their men, they simply climbed out of the trench and advanced in line. The sky was now light and shots began to ring out from unseen German snipers ahead. A distant machine-gun or two, and presently a field-gun opened. North of Huns' Walk the line of men, after going 150 yards, came, to its complete surprise, upon a very old trench, not marked on the maps, possibly a relic of the First Battle of Messines. It afforded sufficient shelter for a jumping-off trench; the troops settled into it, and the remanant - about 80 - of the 47th, reorganised under Captain Williams, joined them. Meanwhile Lieutenant Stoerkel [40] of Cumming's company moved out to patrol, taking Sergeant O'Brien [41] and a private named Wall [42].
In front there was a dip and, although many snipers, and a machine-gun in some trees north of Huns' Walk, were firing spitefully, the three men worked down the depression to Oxygen Trench, 200 yards ahead, and returned with the news that it was empty. Cumming at once sent a platoon by the same route to occupy it. From there a row of willow trees, somewhat widely spaced, gave sufficient cover to allow the same three scouts to reach the first Oosttaverne Trench (Owl Trench). They reported this, too, to be empty, although fierce machine-gun fire came from the clump of trees beyond. Cumming sent forward another platoon, this time in extended order. As it reached the Oosttaverne Line entanglement, a German machine-gun on its left opened fire, but the troops got through with only four casualties. Cumming now brought up the rest of his company [43]. Mayersbeth's company followed, and Captain Williams (47th) advanced to Oxygen Trench in support and to guard the flanks.
Meanwhile the same patrol of three went out to discover the supposed support trench, and the enemy. The Germans were now almost silent, and this silence together with the absence of any visible sign of the enemy, led the Australians to suspect a trap. But the three scouts reached the existent portion of the Oostttaverne support trench, and, on their report that no Germans were there, Cumming sent on thither a platoon of his company and one of Mayersbeth's. These were heavily fired on but reached the trench with few casualties, and found there a Lewis gun team of the 47th which had not retired when the artillery shelled out the rest of the troops on the previous night. For the fourth time the same three went out, but they were presently seen returning, O'Brien and Wall supporting between them their wounded officer. Not a shot was then being fired at them. At this stage there came up to the Oosttaverne Line the two companies of the 48th (under Lieutenants Stabback and Allen) that had been allotted to the 45th. At 3 a.m., when Stabback had reported the failure of the arrangements for the attack, Colonel Herring had instructed him to withdraw his troops temporarily to cover. But while carrying out this order Stabback had seen the advance of the other companies to their jumping-off trench. Thinking that they were about to advanced unsupported, he had obtained leave to visit Colonel Imlay (47th), who suggested that Stabback's companies should join in the operation on the left flank of Mayersbeth and Cumming. At that moment word had arrived from Cumming that Owl Trench had been found empty. Stabback, sending word to Herring, at once led the two companies forward.
They came up in loose formation, under erratic machine-gun fire but without a casualty. Like his colleagues, suspecting a trap, Stabback probed to the left along the first Oosttaverne trench. The blockhouse taken by Muir of the 45th the night before was found empty, but a little farther down the trench could be seen the helmets of Germans, and sniping shots were received from close range. Stabback organised a bombing party and suggested to Colonel Herring that it should attack down the trench towards the Blauwepoortbeek. Herring, however, ordered that this operation should be postponed until after dusk; meanwhile, he said, he would send Captain Allen (45th) to organise it.
Thus, north of Huns' Walk, through an exceptionally fine combination of enterprise and cool judgement on the part of battalion and company leaders, the objectives seized in the original attack had been reoccupied before the Germans had taken advantage of the previous night's withdrawal. South of Huns' Walk, it is true, the British barrage had kept the 44th just outside the objective, and not until late in the morning did the forward troops of that battalion know that the 48th had not come up and gone far beyond their left. The left of the 44th was then ordered to advance and join up, and about 1 o'clock, in bright daylight, with barely a rifle-shot or shell going over, the left company in two waves went forward 150 yards and, to it great surprise, found the linked shell-holes, that represented the first Oosttaverne trench, empty except for the crowded dead of the evening before. It did not advance to the Oosttaverne support line of which, indeed, on that front very little existed.
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Meanwhile the 4th Division also had received a striking report sent at 4.53 from Colonel Salisbury's headquarters near the Blauwepoortbeek. It said that Captain Seager of the 50th had sent word that the Germans could be seen leaving their support position. A machine-gun was still firing from a concrete blockhouse on the left, but the 50th was attacking it. Lewis gunners were firing on the retreating enemy, and the 52nd was sending a patrol down the stream. At 5.30 a German aeroplane flew over that sector dropping white and red lights, and the Germans came forward a little, having perhaps withdrawn too far. But the trench and blockhouses by the Blauwepoortbeek were found empty. Captain Mayersbeth of the 48th, who had relieved the 45th south of the gap, remarked a strange inactivity beyond the barricade, and, himself walking down the trench, found the first blockhouse empty except for two dead Germans and an abandoned field-gun. The 52nd, whom he met lower down, told him that the Germans had gone. Patrols of both brigades searched the fortified farm that had caused so much trouble in the Blauwepoortbeek, and found there another German field-piece. The enemy had taken the breech-blocks from both guns.
[36] Lieut. J.W. Stabback, M.C; 48th Bn. Chemist; of Randwick, N.S.W.; b. Orange, N.S.W, 13 Apr., 1894.
[37] Capt. J.W. Mayersbeth, 48th Bn. Telegraph linesman; of Northam, W. Aust.; b. Lambeth, London, 12 Feb, 1892. Killed in action, 12 June, 1917.
[38] Brigadier A.R. Allen; 48th Bn. Indent Agent, of Adelaide; b. Nunhead, London, 20 Oct., 1888.
[39] He had with him also half of Lieutenant Allen's company, which had missed its way to the 45th.
[40] Lieut. C.W. Tanner, M.C. (served as C.W. Stoerkel); 48th Bn. Farmer; of Orroroo, S. Aust.; b. Edmonton, London, 9 Aug., 1895.
[41] Sgt. M.P. O'Brien, M.M. (No. 2918; 48th Bn.). Grocer of Donald, Vic.; b. Carron, Vic, 1879. Killed in action, 11 June, 1917.
[42] L/Cpl. G.T. Wall, M.M. (No, 2939; 48th Bn.). Labourer; of Leederville, W. Aust.; b. Gwalia, W. Aust., 1881.
[43] That is to say, the platoon first sent to Oxygen Trench. The 48th was still short of men after First Bullecourt, and the company was organised into two platoons.
Source: Australian First World War Official History Chapter XVI - Holding the Gains at Messines, Pages 649 - 653 and 676